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X-WR-CALNAME;VALUE=TEXT:Eventi DIAG
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DTSTART:20191027T030000
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DTSTART:20190331T020000
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UID:calendar.18202.field_data.0@www.open.diag.uniroma1.it
DTSTAMP:20260410T210411Z
CREATED:20190610T084754Z
DESCRIPTION:We study the problem a diagnostic expert (e.g.\, a physician) f
 aces when offering a diagnosis to a client (e.g.\, a patient) that may be 
 based only on her own diagnostic ability or supplemented by a diagnostic t
 est revealing the client’s true condition. The expert’s diagnostic ability
  (or type) is her private information. The expert is impurely altruistic i
 n that she cares about both the client’s utility and her own reputational 
 payoff that depends on the peer perception about her diagnostic ability. T
 he decision of whether to perform the test\, which is costly for the clien
 t\, provides the expert with an opportunity to influence that perception. 
 We show a unique separating equilibrium exists in which the high-type expe
 rt does not resort to diagnostic testing and offers a diagnosis based only
  on her own diagnostic ability\, whereas the low-type expert performs the 
 test. Furthermore\, we establish that the high-type expert may skip necess
 ary diagnostic tests to separate her from the low-type expert. Interesting
 ly\, the effect of reputational payoff on under-testing is non-monotonic\,
  and the desire to appear of high type leads to under-testing only when th
 e reputational payoff is intermediate. Our results also suggest a more alt
 ruistic expert may be more likely to engage in under-testing. Furthermore\
 , efforts to encourage testing by providing financial incentives or by rai
 sing malpractice-lawsuit concerns may\, surprisingly\, help fuel under-tes
 ting in the equilibrium.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20190620T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20190620T150000
LAST-MODIFIED:20191008T082735Z
LOCATION:Aula A3
SUMMARY:Conspicuous by Its Absence: Diagnostic Expert Testing under Uncerta
 inty - Tinglong Dai - Johns Hopkins University
URL;TYPE=URI:http://www.open.diag.uniroma1.it/node/18202
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